The Energy Security of the Baltic States and the Tensions with Russia

Abstract

The outbreak of war in Ukraine turned on the alarm in many European countries that import energy supply from the Eastern market. Especially for the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – energy security is a relevant matter. For historical and geographical reasons, they lay under the Russian influence and have been working on desynchronisation of their energy’s systems since the beginning of the 2000s. The paper aims to show which improvements were taken by the Baltic elites in terms of pipelines and grids, and to analyse the origin of imports. The study will prove if the Baltic region still mainly depends on Russia or if it succeeded in diversification. Looking at the gross internal energy consumption, it will be revealed if renewables represent a concrete alternative to external support.

 

Introduction

Energy security has become a public concern topic in the last months of 2021 when the Russian company Gazprom minimized the supplied gas quantities and raised prices on the European market. Moreover, the subsequent outbreak of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has made the partnership more complicated to manage for Western countries. The weaponization of energy follows in fact the different ideological positions held by each international actor.

The Baltic region, in particular, is part of the most vulnerable group in terms of energy security, due to its past relationship with its Eastern neighbour. Therefore, the first paragraph will consider the literature of other academic researchers to describe some historical premises. Following, the plans for diversification and desynchronisation of natural energetic resources will be traced in order to understand how the three Baltic countries have enhanced their supply chain after gaining independence in 2004. The consultation of local power companies’ websites helped to define where new gas pipelines and electricity links have been built, or where they are intended to be deployed in the short term. The connections can be visualized via maps. Next, data retrieved from Eurostat will demonstrate the origins of Baltic imports by energy source, and they will be used to indicate which raw materials come from foreign production and in which quantities. Furthermore, data will be compared on a time basis, namely, statistics from 2015 and 2020 will show if the Baltics changed partners over five years, and they will be represented by means of some bar charts. Afterwards, the research will analyse the gross inland energy consumption for each of the three States, data are downloaded from Eurostat again. The graphics will reveal which resources are most consumed and thus if external actors effectively hold great power over the country. This will need some geopolitical considerations and a broader outlook, indeed energy security belongs to the foreign policy of a country, and most widely to the defence sector in the presented case. The consequences will lead to a reflection on alternative sources to gas and petroleum, and to draw conclusions on the current goals and the real possibility to reach them.

 

1. Energy Security Preconditions in the Baltic Region

 

1.1. The Soviet Union’s Disintegration

Following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the Baltic area appeared to be the most fragile among the European countries under the energy security circumstances. Its vulnerability was attributable to its dependency on a single gas source, namely Russia, and to some infrastructural problems[1]. Accordingly, at the beginning of the 2000s Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia could receive gas deliveries only via gas transport pipelines connected to the former Soviet Union States. The situation began to be problematic because the lack of competition in their energy markets exposed the three Baltic countries to the possibility of future gas cuts, with severe consequences for the economic sector.  For this reason, academics and experts referred to the area as “Energy Island”: the isolation from the rest of the European energy network could have caused huge energy and economic crisis[2].

 

1.2. Gas Supply

The region, in particular, was linked through the pipeline property of Gazprom: one passing via Latvia and arriving in Estonia, another one coming through Belarus and furnishing both Lithuania and Latvia before it goes to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad. Along with pipelines, Russia owned rail lines and refineries, de facto holding a monopoly on energy infrastructures[3]. As long as Gazprom was owning substantial shares of the Baltic gas companies, inclusion in the European network was not possible.

All things considered, the Russian company’s key feature relied upon the total of infrastructures, raw materials, and the ownership of high shares of the local companies. To be precise, its shares for the year 2014 were: 37% of Eesti Gaas in Estonia, 34% of Latvia’s Gāze in Latvia, and 37% of Lietuvos Dujo in Lithuania[4]. Consequently, Gazprom was able to take advantage for its own benefit, rising prices and excluding rivals from the market. With the objective to intervene in the matter on behalf of the Baltic States, in 2011 the European Union published the Third Energy Package, which regulated the European energetic market and was aimed to avoid monopolies by means of separation between energy production and transmission. The same gas or electricity company was no longer allowed to distribute energy and own the infrastructure system at the same time. Nevertheless, the Baltic elites still could not put enough pressure on the European institutions when gas flows were low, and a coordinated European response was difficult to achieve, being European interests themselves uninvolved[5]. In fact, the Baltic pipelines were isolated from the European network and the region could not provide gas transit services from Russia, thus was politically irrelevant.

Besides, the countries produced natural resources, such as coal and oil, only in limited quantities, in conjunction with not having the means to access the liquid natural gas. The lack of LNG terminals for the conversion of liquid gas arriving by sea was deepening the energy supply problems of the Energy Island[6]. Therefore, in the first years of independence, the most affordable solution from geographical and economic perspectives was maintaining the existent infrastructures and continuing to import supplies from the Eastern market. The crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union had made it difficult to think about the possibility of a renovation in the energetic field, hence programmes for new connections had to wait for better economic conditions[7]. Among other benefits, mainly proximity facilitated access to Russian resources, thus making gas and oil prices cheaper[8].

 

1.3. Electricity Supply

Regards electricity, the Baltic system belongs to the Interconnected Power System/United Power System – IPS/UPS – hence it operates with Russian, Belarusian, and other Eastern countries’ systems[9]. Lithuania was the country that suffered dependency the most due to its large reliance on imports. Before 2009 the land could count on nuclear energy and thanks only to this source it was able to cover up to 77% of its electricity needs. After the publication of the new European regulations in 2009, the last reactor was closed, and the Lithuanian government started to look beyond borders for electricity supply. The switch from being an exporting to an importing country was certainly not an easy task. In the end, Lithuania started buying electricity from Russia, Latvia, and Belarus[10]. On the contrary, Estonia and Latvia were less dependent on external support. The first is rich in oil shale and decided to open a new oil shale plant in 2013, aiming at producing 90% of its electricity with it. Nevertheless, oil shale is believed to be a carbon-intensive fuel with high rates of greenhouse gas emissions and a negative impact on the environment. For this reason, Estonia is the second European country by carbon dioxide emissions per capita, but since the danger of energy vulnerability stands around the corner, Estonian elites prefer to use natural resources produced internally[11]. The latter benefitted from a 42%[12] share of electricity generated by three hydroelectric power plants situated on the Daugava River[13].

 

1.4. The Politicization of Energy

In the end, energy dependence resulted in political and geopolitical dependence.  Indeed, the high import rates from the Russian Federation influenced the political sphere, where political units intertwined with energy interest groups, causing a rise in regional vulnerability levels. As a result, the process to achieve common, homogeneous energy cooperation was difficult and slow to achieve in the area[14]. Some Latvian politicians were even talking about a “Gazpromisation” phenomenon since many colleagues were supporting Gazprom in the extension of its power in the Baltics. The opening of a new gas storage station in Dobele proved this political tendency and former Prime Minister Andris Šķēle was pointed out for supporting the project while also being involved as a businessperson[15].

From these historical and geographical premises, the Baltic countries started to work on common energy security. In doing so, they were supported by the European Union, which itself pursued the objective of creating an internal energy network and of liberalising energy markets. Specifically for the Baltic States, working for better energy security meant equipping themselves with new pipelines interconnected with the other European States, new LNG terminals, and a competitive and diversified internal market.

 

2. Interconnectivity Improvements

The desynchronisation was not considered urgent at the beginning of the 21^st century also because the Baltic elites were aware that interdependence is a double-edged sword. The Russian Federation was interested in avoiding damages to the energy supply chain that provided electricity to its territories as well. The first evidence of needing diversification was in 2006 in fact, when the Druzhba pipeline was closed due to “repairs”[16]. Since then, the Baltic States worked on the issue in the framework of the European Union. In June 2009 the European Commission together with the leaders of eight Member States signed the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan, striving for the integration of infrastructures for a stronger security in the Baltic area. The project covered gas and energy markets advancements, while also addressing the efficiency and the sustainability issues. Notably, the interconnection levels were increased through the Trans-European Energy Networks policy and the financing were received under the Projects of Common Interest[17]. The BEMIP was updated in 2015 with a dedicated working group, which identified a way to increase energy security levels further.

 

2.1. Gas Pipelines

The first steps in the diversification process were taken in Lithuania in 2014. The country provided itself with an LNG terminal in Klaipėda, consisting of a floating storage regasification unit, a berth, and a gas pipeline – Klaipėda-Kursenai – connecting the terminal with the gas station of Amber Grid AB.  The benefits of the facility range from enhancing national energy security to importing natural gas from a broader market. Consequently, energy prices diminished, and customers were provided with the opportunity to choose between a larger number of suppliers. The European Commission affirmed that additional terminals were going to be implemented in the upcoming years.

Not only Klaipeda regasification station allowed Lithuania to become less dependent on Russian gas, but a spillover effect was registered on its neighbours. Thus, the construction placed the LNG terminal as an alternative gas source and ensured higher energy security for the Baltic region as a whole, being capable of covering around 90% of the regional demand.

 

Map 1. Baltic gas pipelines

 

The LNG-terminal in Lithuania was to be added to the underground gas storage Inčulkalns, present in Latvia since 1966. The storage is usually restocked with natural gas during the summer season, and it supplies countries such as Estonia, north-west Russia, and Lithuania. Its capacity can reach 3.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas, accordingly, covering the regional needs. In 2017 the gas storage began to stock gas originating from the Lithuanian LNG terminal [18]. The reinforcement of the cross-border transmission system improved the regional gas market. Latvia declared the wish to extend the scope to Finland[19] and new projects were recognised among the Projects of Common Interest.

Under the BEMIP framework, new pipelines are currently being developed and financed by means of the PCI. The Gas Interconnector Poland – GIPL – strived to connect the Baltic and Finnish gas networks with the European network by the end of 2021[20]. At present, Polish and Lithuanian Transmission System Operators claim that the infrastructure will become active from 1 May 2022[21]. Another example is the planned interconnection between Latvia and Lithuania, the so-called ELLI project, which was part of the BEMIP adopted in 2017 by the European Commission. Expected to be finished by 2024, it will elevate the operating pressure of six pipelines transmitting across the borders up to 50 bar and increase the capacity of flow in both directions from 67.6 GWh/d to 130.47 GWh/d in the Latvian direction, and from 65.1 GWh/d to 119.53 GWh/d in the opposite one[22].

Ultimately, a pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia – the Balticconnector – has been conceived to enhance the reliability and ensure an alternative route connected with the European network. Security levels were supposed to rise, while Baltic markets would have got liberalised and integrated with the continental supply chain. The infrastructure was completed in 2019 and commercial activity started in January 2020[23].

Being the first region to adopt a joint Risk Assessment of risks related to secure gas supply, the Baltics worked hard on diversification of gas sources. As shown above, the completion of GIPL, ELLI and other cooperation projects with Finland will contribute to the securitization of the area and the market will finally meet its goals.

 

2.2. Electricity Network

On the one hand, natural gas diversification has been indicated as a successful policy, on the other hand, electricity did not receive the same attention and is still believed to be the Baltic blind spot[24].

 

Map 2. Baltic electricity network

 

The Baltic electricity grid is the only European system still integrated along with the Russian and Belarusian network – the BRELL ring – meaning that Russia controls the frequency, the most important parameter of a power system, and is able to influence the commercial flow[25]. For this reason, the European Commission established a dedicated working group under the BEMIP framework to figure out a way to desynchronise the European lands by the target date of 2025[26]. In 2026 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are expected to completely join the Continental European Network – CEN – and abandon the IPS/UPS system forever.

However, the achievement implies some geopolitical considerations. Moscow is not a passive onlooker, it has already started to reinforce the self-sufficiency of its territory in Kaliningrad in fact, building new connectors that intentionally avoid the Baltic lands. Energy cuts have proven to be a weapon for the first time back in 2019 when a storm hit Latvia and the Baltic undersea lines faced a power outage. According to BRELL agreements, in such situations, Russia should have intervened to stabilize the grids with its power reserves, but the supply came from Poland in the end[27]. Given the uncertainty related to the volatile reliance, for the area, it is vital to develop multiple entry points and a reverse flows strategy.

Estonia is linked since 2006 to Finland through the Estlink1 and since 2014 through the Estlink2 submarine cables, for a total capacity of 1000 MW.[28] The European Commission affirmed that the total interconnection capacity increased to around 10% after the second interconnection was placed[29].

The Litpol and Nordbalt links connect Lithuania with the Baltic electricity market since 2015. The first one is a back-to-back power interconnection with Poland and has a power rating of 500 MW[30]. The latter connects Lithuania with Sweden, integrating the emerging Baltic electricity market with the Nordic European one with a power rating of 700 MW[31]. Both linkages rose the energy security level of the whole Baltic region to 23.7% and opened a competition for Baltic consumers[32]. Furthermore, the Lithuanian government forecasts to improve security with a cable directed to Poland – Harmony link -, the construction works of which are expected to end by 2025. [33]

Finally, the Latvian-Estonian interconnectivity will be improved with a strategic infrastructure of 600 MW[34]. At the same time, the overhead L300 Baltic-Tartu and L301 Tartu-Valmiera are being renovated, respectively in the 2020-2022 and 2022-2024 periods, considering that their capacity has to be expanded before the official disconnection from the Russian grid in 2025[35].

In 2018 the three countries together with Poland and the European Commission signed the Political Roadmap for Synchronisation and their Transmission System Operators launched the formal procedure to extend the Continental European Network. The plan envisaged reinforcing and connecting the power systems, as well as building synchronous condensers, and upgrading protection and control systems[36]. The Litpol link was pointed out as the main feature of this strategic vision, among its tasks the interconnection is expected to supply energy security and price diversification.

The inclusion in the European network marks a major step for the Baltic region because once the three countries will have completed the connection, they will benefit from the potential of the legally bounding solidarity clause, which mitigates the effects of possible disruptions or difficult climate conditions on the basis of Article 194 TFUE. In the event of a supply crisis, Member States are granted cooperation following the emergency plans previously accorded at the regional level and supervised by the European Commission. The risk assessment ensures the proper functioning of internal energy markets and protects essential social services, for example, the heating of households, thanks to an immediate reaction[37].

 

3. Energy Security Trends

To better understand the Baltic reliance on foreign energy support, data provided by Eurostat will be visualized. The analysis will firstly concentrate on energy imports and their origin, in order to acknowledge where the Baltics take the resources to compensate their internal production. Secondly, data collected in years 2015 and 2020 will be compared, the trends will show if the Baltics are effectively improving the diversification of their network. In the end the gross energy consumption will be considered and provide information about the internal use of resources, which ones are the most consumed, which one are being dismissed and replaced over time.

 

3.1. Origin of Imports and Trend Analysis

In Figures 1, 2 and 3 numbers on the x-axis represent the import percentage, whereas the coordinate axis shows the imported natural resources both for 2015 and 2020.

Figure 1

As can be seen in Figure 1, Estonia highly depends on Russia for fossil fuels and natural gas imports. The Eastern country remains the leading exporter over time, even if in 2020 Lithuania holds a share of 7% of natural gas export. Moreover, a large portion of oil and petroleum products come from the Russian Federation, along with Lithuania and Finland. For what concerns electricity, Finland is the main source. Nuclear energy is not deployed.

 

Figure 2

 

Latvian imports follow the Estonian trend of counting on Russia for solid fossil fuels and natural gas primarily. In general, the trend is towards diversification away from Russia, even though other origins’ percentages are still low in 2020. The most heterogeneous market is oil and petroleum products, with imports arriving from Finland (20,1%), Lithuania (48,9%), Belarus (3,7%), the Russian Federation (20,3%), Estonia (1,2%), Poland (0,5%), Switzerland (4,7%), Germany (0,2%) and China (0,1%).

 

Figure 3

Figure 3 shows similarly that Lithuania relies on Russia for solid fossil fuels, as well as oil and petroleum products, and natural gas. The gas dependency from Russia is halved from 82,6% in 2015 to 41,8% in 2020 as a result of the opening of the Klaipėda LNG terminal. Accordingly, data reveal a share of 20,7% imports arriving from the USA. Therefore, the Baltic region seems to be deeply tied to the Russian market and the path toward the diversification of sources is still long.

 

Figure 4, Energy imports dependency

Lastly, Figure 4 demonstrates how much dependent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are on imports compared to the average of the 27 European Member States and to the Members of the Euro area. The three countries appear to be less dependent on average, with Estonian dependency at the lowest and Lithuanian dependency at the highest.

 

3.2. Gross Inland Consumption Analysis

Eurostat defines gross inland energy consumption as the total energy demand of a country, or to say the quantity of energy necessary to satisfy the inland consumption. The term refers to the consumption by the energy sector, the distribution and transformation losses, the final energy consumption by end-users, and the statistical differences. It is therefore the sum of primary production, recovered production, imports and variations of stocks, minus bunkers.

 

Figure 5

Estonian energy consumption mainly relies on oil shale and oil sands, though the trend in the use of such resources is decreasing. The reason behind the decline is probably due to the conflict between the contaminating nature of oil shale and the European commitment to a greener world. Since oil shale is directly extracted in Estonia, it can be concluded that dependency levels are low, except for natural gas, and oil and petroleum products, which are highly import-related. The negative values represent net electricity export.

 

Figure 6

Latvia consumes predominantly oil and petroleum products, natural gas, renewables and biofuels. The first two are imported resources, whereas the third ones are primarily produced inland. Natural gas consumption has slightly diminished from 2010 and is being replaced by more renewables and biofuels, together with oil and petroleum products, and electricity.

 

Figure 7

As can be seen in Figure 9, Lithuanian consumption is based in large part on renewables and biofuels, but also oil and petroleum, and natural gas. Clean-energy resources gained use over time, making dependence on less sustainable supplies go down. In 2017 Lithuania was even able to export a small portion of electricity.

Seen the high dependency rates in gas consumption for Latvia and Lithuania and the origin of such imports, the aforementioned Baltic States seem to rely mainly on Russia. All of the three countries are supported by the Russian Federation for fossil fuels too, but their effective inland consumption is low. For what concerns oil and petroleum products, only Latvia and Lithuania use them in large quantity, with Lithuania more dependent once again on Russia. The results are confirmed by energy imports dependency retrieved from Eurostat.

 

4. Geopolitical Consequences

The relationship of dependence relates to the distinction between “sensitivity interdependence” and “vulnerability interdependence”[44]. The main difference between the two definitions is the level of dependence: the first refers to a lower grade of severity, a state’s economy may experience a negative impact, but it would survive the crisis; on the other hand, vulnerability is riskier and needs a quicker response.

The last term applies to the interconnection between the Baltic States and Russia as the Baltics are considered vulnerable and a trade war could drag them down in a crisis[45]. Since the Baltic market is not economically important to Russia, the interdependence is considered asymmetrical. Russian exports for the year 2020 to Latvia were 2.23B, Estonia $2.59B, and Lithuania $2.39B[46]. Nevertheless, from the opening of the Balticconnector and other interconnections belonging to the European network the region plays an important role in gas and petroleum transit, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of energy to further European destinations. Consequently, the Kremlin started to look around for solutions and has developed a strategy comprising the construction of alternative routes, namely the Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Turkish Stream and the Power of Siberia pipelines.

However, the complex situation must be framed inside a broader strategic vision according to Keohane’s and Nye’s interdependence theory. Russian weight in the Baltic energy security undergoes military security conditions. The Baltic States are part of the eastern flank of NATO, therefore their integration into the Russian energy infrastructure is meant to balance the presence of the Western military alliance in the region[47]. Moreover, the Baltics register a high presence of Russian immigrants in their populations, thus energy is used as a weapon to prevent any kind of discrimination.

The request of the Estonian Defence minister for a strengthening of NATO’s presence in the Baltics following the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 reflects well the interdependence hypothesis. Estonia, likewise, its neighbours, fears the extension of the conflict to the area and the possibility of retaliation in the energy sector, as the country has engaged itself actively in the reception of war refugees from Ukraine[48]. According to the Bank of Estonia, the outbreak of war has influenced markets, prices of natural gas and electricity are increasing, and households’ consumption is expected to reduce in the short term. Therefore, the Estonian government decided to place natural gas and heating under a price ceiling until spring 2022[49]. Lithuania on its side is bringing forward the GIPL project with Poland and is looking forward to opening the pipeline ahead of schedule, on May 1^st. The three countries foresee closer regional and European cooperation to reduce their dependence.

In the past, Russia could benefit from the European uncertainty due to the different levels of European involvement in the matter and the controversy in the support of stronger sanctions. But a comprehensive energy network has been developed in the past twenty years and now the European Union presents itself as a single and active actor in the international environment, that stands for the democratic values and is ready to defend itself against external claims of special interest zones in the former Soviet space[50]. For the Baltic States, this means knowing that they can fully lean on Western support in asserting their own sovereignty.

Therefore, to reinforce its self-determination, the European Union launched the REPower plan in March 2022, aiming at phasing out the fossil fuels import dependence from Russia. The strategy requires the almost complete filling up of the capacity gas stock storage before winter, the replacement of gas in heating and power generation and more renewables investments[51].

 

5. Renewables for the Future

The Baltic States, as members of the European Union, adhering to the Green Deal in 2019, hence they are planning to reduce carbon emissions by 2030 and reach climate neutrality by 2050. The Baltic Sea basin had already started to use renewables to produce energy a time ago – in 2014 Lithuania reached its national renewable energy target for 2020 – and it could take advantage of clean energy to secure itself from external actions. For this reason, wind farms and other sustainable resources can be included among the tools of geopolitical nature available for the Baltic countries to emancipate themselves from Russian control. And since their energy security is vulnerable to import cuts, especially after the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the Western condemnation of the Russian elites, a plan to enhance cleaner energy sources could play an important role on the regional chessboard.

On top of it, sustainable energy is less subject to sudden price fluctuations, so its prices are more stable[52]. Renewables are the cheapest source of power, and they follow the learning curves: their prices decrease every time their cumulative capacity increases. Not only there are economic advantages for investors, but also common people enjoy the positive aspects, for example, they have more money to spend in other sectors. Consequently, renewable resources favour indirectly the economic growth of a country[53].

The three countries are forerunners in the renewables sector and have developed their plans to secure their power supply. Lithuania has approved the National energy and climate action plan for 2021-2030, which goals precisely are the competitiveness of the energy sector and the growth of the renewables’ share resources in the gross final energy consumption to 45% by 2030. Thanks to lower prices and a more positive import-export balance, competitiveness will be achieved. The strategy follows the most cost-effective way, thus considering the maturity of technologies, and requires modernization in the 2020-2030 period for 14 biogas plants and 9 biomass plants. However, the main resource for electricity will be wind energy, with a share of 70%[54]. Lithuanian Minister of Energy Vaičiūnas declared that he foresees having 700 MW of wind farms by 2030 and that the Harmony link will be included in the project[55].

Similarly, Estonia submitted to the European Commission a National Energy and climate plan by 2030, in which it stands that renewable energy will cover at least 42% of gross final energy consumption. Furthermore, the government’s intentions are to employ internal natural resources to the maximum extent possible in order to reduce reliance on imports. Conjointly, the country signed a common project along with Latvia to build a wind farm in the Gulf of Riga, that would produce 1000 MV by 2030 and thus cover 40% of Estonian electricity demand[56]. Eurostat reports that Latvia was the third European Member for a share of renewable sources in 2018[57], thereby it raised its RES energy target by 2030 to 50%.

 

Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption

Table 1

 

 

Renewable energy resources are becoming more and more employed by the Baltic States for their internal consumption, and today represent a large share, as seen in Table 1. Nevertheless, clear energy is not replacing gas and petroleum products, on contrary Estonia is using RES to reduce its oil shale and oil sands shares. As a result, the Baltic dependence on materials coming from the outside, mainly from Russia, still has high levels. Besides, a long supply chain is essential for renewable components, such as wind turbines and solar cells[59]. Since the components are produced all over the world, procurement is low and difficult, and many countries that do not share the same strategic vision could affect the procurement. For example, materials are often refined in China, so the Asian market could decide to not furnish Western partners for its own benefit, raising prices or using the issue to obtain something else on the negotiating table. The Baltics have certainly learned the lesson back in 2014, after the first Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and have managed to avoid the worst effects again in 2022, but decoupling energy security and foreign policy is not an easy task. Hence, renewables are going to attach more weight in the long term, even though they have been listed as a solution in the REPower plan by the European Commission. Instead, it is more likely that the Baltics will firstly access more LNG imports from the USA and other countries in the short term, which can be transformed into Klaipėda and then stored in Inčulkalns to secure the whole Baltic region.

 

Conclusions

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s energy securities were the most affected after the Soviet disintegration because their systems were mainly connected to the former Soviet States. At first, the Baltic elites benefitted from the geographical proximity and the reasonable prices offered by the Eastern market, but soon the isolation from the Continental European Network became a burden. In order to avoid cuts in their imports, the Baltic region opened to cooperation and connected itself to the world with new gas pipelines – GIPL, ELLI, Balticconnector, Klaipėda-Kursenai –, new LNG terminals and new electricity links – Estlink 1 and 2, Litpol, Nordbalt, Harmony. Electricity integration did not reach the same levels as gas but being associated with the European market decreased vulnerability because in times of crisis Member States can benefit from the solidarity regulations.

The data analysis showed that most of the Baltic imports relied and still are dependent on the Russian Federation, especially for gas and oil and petroleum products. Estonia is less dependent thanks to its raw materials, whereas Lithuania is the most subject to external influence. However, the latter managed to substitute half of the Russian gas imports with American LNG gas in 5 years. Conjointly, renewable resources have been employed for many years by the Baltics instead of more pollutant materials. On the one side, the usage of clean energy helped customers to pay cheaper prices and made elites meet the European Green Deal’s requirements. On the other side, dependence levels did not decrease, and it is not possible to affirm that the Baltic States are achieving the energy security goal by means of renewables. In fact, Russian influence in the sector reflects the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence on the Eastern flank territory and from its perspective, it should remain a tool in the Kremlin’s hands. Therefore, Russia puts pressure to ensure that it will still hold power in the region in the future. In conclusion, for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania there is at stake their sovereignty. Since the first conflict in Ukraine in 2014, they gained weight inside the European Union. Today they are able to catch the European and American interests and involve them in the area, as they represent the first advocates of the democratic values on the border with Russia. It is no surprise if they were concerned about the Ukrainian invasion and pushed the other European neighbours to impose hard sanctions on Russia. Today they inspire other European countries to follow their example, both for their resilience and for being clean energy’s forerunners.

 

Margherita Ceserani

 

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• Grigas, Agnia, Andres Kasekamp, Kristina Maslauskaite, Liva Zorgenfreija, and Jerzy Buzek. THE BALTIC STATES IN THE EU: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW. Jaques Delors Institute, 2013.
• Grigas, Agnia. “The Baltic Gas Sector: Legacy of Dependence.” Essay. In The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, 77–104. London: Routledge, 2016.
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• Jaaskelainen, Jaakko, Jaana Lager, and Sanna Syri. “Development of Energy Security in Finland and in the Baltic States since 1991.” 2019 16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/eem.2019.8916452.
• Jermalavičius, Tomas. “Baltic States Must Remain on the Same Frequency in Energy Security.” ICDS, December 17, 2021. https://icds.ee/en/baltic-states-must-remain-on-the-same-frequency-in-energy-security/.
• Kryptis, Dizaino. “Gas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania (GIPL).” Natural Gas Transmission System Operator. Amber Grid. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.ambergrid.lt/en/projects/gas-interconnection-poland-lithuania-gipl.
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• Maigre, Merle. “ENERGY SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE BALTIC STATES.” Dissertation, International Centre for Defence and Security, 2010.
• McCorkell, Andrew. “Estonia and Latvia Sign Pact for 1GW Offshore Wind Farm.” Windpower Monthly, July 31, 2020. https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1690879/estonia-latvia-sign-pact-1gw-offshore-wind-farm.
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• “REPowerEU: Joint European Action for More Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy.” European Commission , March 8, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511.
• Roser, Max. “Why Did Renewables Become so Cheap so Fast?” Our World in Data, December 1, 2020. https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth.
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• “Synchronisation with Continental Europe.” Elering. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://elering.ee/en/synchronization-continental-europe.
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Maps

• Tuohy, Emmet. “Baltic Electricity.” Map. Baltic Energy Interconnections Maps. International Centre for Defence and Security, 2013.
• Tuohy, Emmet. “Baltic Oil and Gas.” Map. Baltic Energy Interconnections Maps. International Centre for Defence and Security, 2013

 

Footnotes

[1] Grigas, Agnia. “The Baltic Gas Sector: Legacy of Dependence.” Essay. In The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, 77–104. London: Routledge, 2016.

[2] Jaaskelainen, Jaakko, Jaana Lager, and Sanna Syri. “Development of Energy Security in Finland and in the Baltic States since 1991.” 2019 16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/eem.2019.8916452.

[3] Smith, Keith C. Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism ? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

[4] “Baltic Energy Sources: Diversifying Away from Russia.” Baltic Bullettin, June 14, 2017. Foreign policy research institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/06/baltic-energy-sources-diversifying-away-russia/.

[5] Grigas, Agnia. “The Baltic Gas Sector: Legacy of Dependence.” Essay. In The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, 77–104. London: Routledge, 2016.

[6] Grigas, Agnia. “The Baltic Gas Sector: Legacy of Dependence.” Essay. In The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, 77–104. London: Routledge, 2016.

[7] Jaaskelainen, Jaakko, Jaana Lager, and Sanna Syri. “Development of Energy Security in Finland and in the Baltic States since 1991.” 2019 16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/eem.2019.8916452.

[8] Smith, Keith C. Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism ? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

[9] Augutis, Juozas, Ričardas Krikštolaitis, Linas Martišauskas, Sigita Urbonienė, Rolandas Urbonas, and Aistė Barbora Ušpurienė. “Analysis of Energy Security Level in the Baltic States Based on Indicator Approach.” Energy 199 (2020): 117427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117427.

[10] Augutis, Juozas, Ričardas Krikštolaitis, Linas Martišauskas, Sigita Urbonienė, Rolandas Urbonas, and Aistė Barbora Ušpurienė. “Analysis of Energy Security Level in the Baltic States Based on Indicator Approach.” Energy 199 (2020): 117427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117427.

[11] Mórawska, Grażyna. “The Renewable Energy in Baltic States versus Russian Federation Political Interests.” Dissertation, Energy policy studies, 2020.

[12] Data detected in year 2011

[13] Grigas, Agnia, Andres Kasekamp, Kristina Maslauskaite, Liva Zorgenfreija, and Jerzy Buzek. Rep. THE BALTIC STATES IN THE EU: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW. Jaques Delors Institute, 2013.

[14] Grigas, Agnia, Andres Kasekamp, Kristina Maslauskaite, Liva Zorgenfreija, and Jerzy Buzek. Rep. THE BALTIC STATES IN THE EU: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW. Jaques Delors Institute, 2013.

[15] Maigre, Merle. “ENERGY SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE BALTIC STATES.” Dissertation, International Centre for Defence and Security, 2010.

[16] Jermalavičius, Tomas. “Baltic States Must Remain on the Same Frequency in Energy Security.” ICDS, December 17, 2021. https://icds.ee/en/baltic-states-must-remain-on-the-same-frequency-in-energy-security/.

[17] PA Energy – Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) Action Plan for competitive, secure and sustainable energy. European Commission (2021).

[18] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Lithuania., 2017.

[19]  “Enhancement of Latvia – Lithuania Interconnection.” Conexus Baltic Grid. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.conexus.lv/elli-eng.

[20] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Lithuania., 2017.

[21] Kryptis, Dizaino. “Gas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania (GIPL).” Natural Gas Transmission System Operator. Amber Grid. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.ambergrid.lt/en/projects/gas-interconnection-poland-lithuania-gipl.

[22] A’Hearn, Brendan. “Lithuania Pushes Ahead with Gas Interconnection Project.” Argus Media, February 10, 2022. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2300677-lithuania-pushes-ahead-with-gas-interconnection-project.

[23] Bottino, Francesco. “INAUGURATO IL NUOVO GASDOTTO BALTICCONNECTOR TRA ESTONIA E FINLANDIA.” Pipeline News, 2019.

[24] Jermalavičius, Tomas. “Baltic States Must Remain on the Same Frequency in Energy Security.” ICDS, December 17, 2021. https://icds.ee/en/baltic-states-must-remain-on-the-same-frequency-in-energy-security/.

[25] “Synchronisation with Continental Europe.” Elering. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://elering.ee/en/synchronization-continental-europe.

[26] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Estonia., 2017.

[27] Jermalavičius, Tomas. “Baltic States Must Remain on the Same Frequency in Energy Security.” ICDS, December 17, 2021. https://icds.ee/en/baltic-states-must-remain-on-the-same-frequency-in-energy-security/.

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[29] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Estonia., 2017.

[30] “Litpol Link: Hitachi Energy.” Litpol link | Hitachi Energy. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://www.hitachienergy.com/case-studies/litpol-link.

[31] “Nordbalt.” Hitachi Energy. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://www.hitachienergy.com/it/it/case-studies/nordbalt.

[32] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Latvia., 2017.

[33] Harmony link, October 8, 2021. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://harmonylink.eu/.

[34] European Commission. Rep. Commission Staff Working Document. Energy Union Factsheet Latvia., 2017.

[35] “Synchronisation with Continental Europe.” Elering. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://elering.ee/en/synchronization-continental-europe.

[36] PA Energy – Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) Action Plan for competitive, secure and sustainable energy. European Commission (2021).

[37] Buzek, Jerzy. Rep. On the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (COM(2016)0052 – C8‑0035/2016 – 2016/0030(COD)). Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 2016.

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[44] Baldwin, David A. “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis.” International Organization 34, no. 4 (1980): 471–506. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300018828.

[45] Mórawska, Grażyna. “The Renewable Energy in Baltic States versus Russian Federation Political Interests.” Dissertation, Energy policy studies, 2020.

[46] Russia exports by country. Trading Economics. Accessed March 18, 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports-by-country.

[47] Mórawska, Grażyna. “The Renewable Energy in Baltic States versus Russian Federation Political Interests.” Dissertation, Energy policy studies, 2020.

[48] Estonian World, & About The Author Estonian World Estonian World is a global independent online magazine. (2022, March 17). Live updates: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – reactions in Estonia.

[49] Pert, S. (2022, March 6). Uncertainty in commodities markets is causing strong price pressures. Eesti Pank. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from https://www.eestipank.ee/en/press/uncertainty-commodities-markets-causing-strong-price-pressures-07032022

[50] Bergmane, Una. “Latvia’s First Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 13, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/latvias-first-response-to-russias-war-in-ukraine/.

[51] “REPowerEU: Joint European Action for More Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy.” European Commission, March 8, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511.

[52] Trakimavičius, Lukas. “The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy in the Baltics.” International Centre for Defence and Security, January 31, 2022.

[53] Roser, Max. “Why Did Renewables Become so Cheap so Fast?” Our World in Data, December 1, 2020. https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth.

[54] https://www.climate-laws.org/geographies/lithuania/policies/national-energy-and-climate-plan-of-the-republic-of-lithuania-for-2021-2030

[55]  “Offshore Wind – Another Direction of Renewable Energy to Strengthen Local Power Generation in Lithuania.” Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania. Accessed March 21, 2022. https://enmin.lrv.lt/en/news/offshore-wind-another-direction-of-renewable-energy-to-strengthen-local-power-generation-in-lithuania.

[56] McCorkell, Andrew. “Estonia and Latvia Sign Pact for 1GW Offshore Wind Farm.” Windpower Monthly, July 31, 2020. https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1690879/estonia-latvia-sign-pact-1gw-offshore-wind-farm.

[57] EU_Eurostat. “Share of Renewable Energy in the EU up to 18.0% .” Twitter. January 23, 2020. https://twitter.com/EU_Eurostat/status/1220285257393545216.

[58] “Share of Renewable Energy in Gross Final Energy Consumption.” Eurostat. European Commission. Accessed March 22, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/t2020_31/default/table?lang=en.

[59] Trakimavičius, Lukas. “The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy in the Baltics.” International Centre for Defence and Security, January 31, 2022.